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Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 51 (November 12, 2009)1
 
 
FAMILY LAW – DEFAULT DIVORCE AND CHILD CUSTODY 
 
Appeal from district court’s amended default divorce decree determining custody of the 
parties’ three minor children and dividing community property. The Court decided three separate 
issues in the appeal: (1) Whether the district court had home-state jurisdiction to make child 
custody determinations under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 
codified at NRS Chapter 125A; (2) Whether the district court properly held that Nevada served 
as the children’s “habitual residence” and granted immediate return of the children, even though 
Japan is not a signatory of Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction; (3) whether the district court properly entered the decree by default, notwithstanding, 
that Shinichi, through counsel, answered the divorce complaint and filed a countercomplaint for 
divorce? 
Summary 
 
The Court answered the first question affirmatively holding the district court had home-
state jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(UCCJEA), codified at NRS Chapter 125A. The Court also found the district court within its 
authority to enter custody orders under UCCJEA. However, they noted the order is 
unenforceable under the Hague Convention, since Japan is not a signatory. Nevertheless the 
parties are free to pursue other remedies and the inapplicability of the Hague Convention did not 
limit the district court’s authority to order the children’s immediate return.  Finally, the Court 
held that the district court erred in awarding the divorce decree by default because Shinichi made 
an appearance through counsel, answered the complaint, and demonstrated intent to defend 
against the action. 
Outcome 
 
Appellant Shinichi Ogawa and respondent Yoko Ogawa married in Japan in 1997. 
Between 1998 and 2002, the parties had three children, all born in Japan. During this time the 
couple lived intermittently in the U.S. and Japan. Yoko became a permanent resident of the U.S. 
and the couple bought a home in Henderson, Nevada. 
Factual and Procedural History 
Although the parties ultimately settled in Japan, in early 2003, Yoko and the children 
traveled to the U.S. and she decided they should stay permanently in Henderson, Nevada. In 
2004, the children returned to Japan for an alleged summer vacation. However, at the end of 
summer, Sinichi told Yoko the children would be staying. The children have resided with their 
father since that date. 
Eight months after the children returned to Japan, Yoko filed for divorce in Nevada 
district court. She also petitioned the district court for the immediate return of her children. 
During a hearing, the district court noted it had subject matter jurisdiction over the custody issue, 
because Nevada was the children’s “habitual residence.”2
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 Although Sinichi had not been served 
with any court documents, the court entered an ex parte order awarding Yoko temporary sole 
2 See International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611 (1988). 
custody of the children, and ordered Shinichi to return the children immediately on March 29, 
2005. 
Shortly after being served on January 10, 2006, Shinichi, through U.S counsel, moved to 
vacate the March order. He challenged the courts subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the 
custody issues. In February 2006, Yoko filed a motion for an order to show cause why Shinichi 
should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the March order directing him to return 
the children to the Unites States.  At a subsequent hearing on the motion, in which Shinichi 
appeared through counsel, the district court confirmed its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
the UCCJEA and ordered Shinichi to appear and show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt.  
On May 16, 2006 Shinichi filed an answer and countercomplaint for divorce. The district 
court heard the divorce proceeding on September 20, 2006. Once again Sinichi appeared solely 
through counsel. The district court declared that it would enter a default judgment against 
Shinichi based on his non-appearance. The district court explained that whatever Yoko requested 
in the order would be granted in the decree. 
 The district court entered a default divorce decree on November 22, 2006. The order gave 
Yoko sole legal and physical custody and ordered that Shinichi have “no contact with the minor 
children.” Furthermore, Yoko was awarded spousal and child support, the marital home, car, and 
all personal property. Shinichi timely appealed. 
 
 The issues raised on appeal include whether the district court properly (1) exercised 
subject matter jurisdiction over the children; (2) relied on the Hague Convention and ordered the 
children’s return; and (3) entered a default divorce decree against Shinichi. 
Discussion 
 
The district court properly determined that Nevada is the children’s home state 
 The Court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction to enter custody 
orders. Although the children had not physically been present in Nevada for eight months when 
Yoko filed her complaint, their absence was expressly due to Shinichi’s wrongful extension of 
what should have been a vacation. Therefore, the Court did not count the summer vacation 
months in determining home state jurisdiction. 
 The Court noted that the UCCJEA governs subject matter jurisdiction over child custody 
issues.3 The UCCJEA serves to prevent jurisdictional conflicts in child custody issues and to 
deter child abduction.4 The UCCJEA permits only one state, usually the “home state,” to have 
authority to make custody determinations.5 “Home State” is defined as the state in which a child 
lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months, including any temporary absence from the 
state, immediately before the child custody proceeding commenced.6 Therefore, the Court 
recognized that a “temporary absence” during the six-month time frame of home-state residency 
does not extinguish state jurisdiction.7
                                                 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.305 (2007). 
 Thus, the Court concluded that if Nevada is either the 
child’s home state when the child custody proceedings commence, or was the child’s home state 
4 UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 101 cmt. (1997); 9 U.L.A. 657 (1999) 
(explaining the UCCJEA’s purpose; see also Ruffier v. Ruffier, 190 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. App. 2006); see 
generally NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 125A (2007).  
5 See Hart v. Kozik, 242 S.W.3d 102, 106-07 (Tex. App. 2007). 
6 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.085 (2007). 
7 See Felty v. Felty, 882 N.Y.S.2d 504, 508 (N.Y. App.Div. 2009). 
within six months before the proceeding commenced and the child is absent from Nevada, but a 
parent continues to live in Nevada, Nevada courts have jurisdictional priority to make initial 
child custody determinations.1
In this case, the Court noted that substantial evidence supports the district courts finding 
that the children left Nevada and traveled to Japan for a three-month summer vacation. 
Consequently, pursuant to UCCJEA, the Court found Nevada to be the children’s home state 
because the vacation from June through August did not interrupt the six-month pre-complaint 
residency requirement. 
  
 
Although the Hague Convention does not provide a basis for the district court to order the 
children’s return to the U.S., the district court had authority to enter custody orders, since it had 
jurisdiction over the custody dispute under the UCCJEA 
 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is an 
international treaty that promotes the prompt return of children wrongfully taken from their state 
of residence.8 When the district court ordered the return of the children it referenced the Hague 
Convention as authority. However, Japan is not a signatory to the Hague Convention; therefore, 
the Court ruled it did not apply to this case.2
 Nevertheless, the Court did affirm the district court’s authority to issue the order pursuant 
to the UCCJEA. Thus, it held the district court properly granted the motion for the children’s 
immediate return even though the Hague Convention enforcement remedies do not apply. 
 
 
Default Divorce Decree 
 Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) governs default procedure, and provides, “When a 
party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the 
clerk shall enter the party’s default.”9
 The Court concluded that default was inappropriate in this case because Shinichi 
answered the complaint and appeared at the divorce hearing through counsel.
 
10  
                                                 
1 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.305(1)(a) (2007).  
Therefore, the 
Court concluded that the district court erred in entering default against Shinichi. 
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611 (1988).  
2 U.S. v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 881 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that the Hague Convention principles are applicable 
only to those countries that have signed the Convention and thereby agreed to abide by its terms); Taveras v. 
Taveras, 397 F. Supp. 2d 908, 912 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (acknowledging that there is no remedy under the Hague 
Convention when a nonsignatory country is involved and that “hard-line view” applies because “only those 
countries that are signatories have an obligation to reciprocate by affording litigants the same remedies in their 
courts”); Mezo v. Elmergawi, 855 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (same); Matter of Mohsen, 715 F. Supp. 1063, 
1065 (D. Wyo. 1989) (same); see also Smita Aiyar, International Child Abductions Involving Non-Hague 
Convention States: The Need for a Uniform Approach, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 277, 294-97 (2007) (discussing 
remedies beyond the Hague Convention and noting that nonsignatory nations generally ignore signatory nations’ 
requests for the children’s return and instead apply their own laws to determine custody issues). 
9 NEV. R. CIV. P .55(a). 
10 See In Interest of M.M., 708 So. 2d 990, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (providing that a trial court’s decision to 
enter a default judgment against parties for failing to appear at a hearing was improper because the parties 
“‘appear[ed]’ through their counsel”); Owen v. Healy,  896 A.2d 965, 967-68 (Me. 2006) (pointing out that the “fact 
that a person is a party to a civil action does not in itself impose a legal obligation upon that person to be present at 
trial,” and thus, when a party does not personally appear at trial, but his or her attorney does appear, a default against 
that party is not appropriate); Rocky Produce, Inc. v. Frontera, 449 N.W.2d 916, 917 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) 
(reversing a default judgment entered based on a civil defendant’s failure to personally appear at trial and holding 
     The Court concluded that, under the UCCJEA, Nevada is the children’s’ home state. 
Since Nevada is the home state, the district court exercised proper authority to render custody 
decisions. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the district court had authority to order the 
immediate return of the children pursuant to the UCCJEA. Finally, because  filed responsive 
pleadings and appeared through his attorney, the Court concluded that the district court erred in 
entering a default judgment against him. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s 
default judgment and remanded the matter to the district court for a decision on the merits.  
Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                             
that, “absent a subpoena or order from the court to appear, a defendant in a civil case is not required to appear in 
person for a scheduled trial”); In re Brandon A., 769 A.2d 586, 589 (R.I. 2001) (defining “an appearance as ‘[a] 
coming into court as party to a suit, either in person or by attorney’”) (quoting Nisenzon v. Sadowski, 689 A.2d 
1037, 1048 (R.I. 1997)); LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 778 S.W.2d 865, 865 (Tex. 1989) (concluding that if a party is 
represented at trial by counsel, there is no default judgment even if the party does not personally appear); see also 
State v. Sargent, 122 Nev. 210, 216, 128 P.3d 1052, 1056 (2006) (explaining, in the context of a criminal case 
proceeding in the justice court, that “when the defendant files a waiver of his personal appearance and his counsel 
appears at the preliminary hearing on the date and time required, the defendant’s lack of personal appearance does 
not constitute a failure to appear”); Fritz Hansen A/S v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 650, 653, 6 P.3d 982, 983 (2000) 
(indicating that a party may make an appearance either in person or through his or her attorney).  
